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We analyse the role of health in determining the difference between desired and actual hours 
of work in a sample of German men using the Socio-Economic Panel Data for years 1996-
2007. The effects of both self-assessed health and legal disability status are examined. 
About 60% of employees report working more than they would wish with the mean difference 
of -3.9 hours/week. We estimate static and dynamic model specifications allowing for auto-
regressive nature of the dependent variable and testing for the role of lagged health status. 
Important differences are found between east and west German Länder. In the west we find 
statistically significant role of general health measures in determining the disequilibrium. 
Employees in bad health want to work on average by about 0.4 hour/week less according to 
the static specification, and by about 1 hour/week less if dynamics of health and of the 
disequilibrium are taken into account. This is respectively 10% and 25% of the mean 
difference. We find no effects of legal disability status on the disequilibrium which we interpret 
as a reflection of stronger legal position of disabled employees. In both east and west we find 
significant state dependence in the hours disequilibrium. 
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Deteriorating health may result in a direct welfare loss and in an indirect lowering of the
quality of life through limitations on labour market activity and, as a further consequence
of that, the level of income. The degree to which poor health indirectly aects welfare will
primarily depend on how easy it is to maintain employment and/or income once health
worsens. It is well documented in the literature that poorer health is correlated with lower
labour market participation and may lead to loss of employment (e.g., Bound et al., 1999;
Riphahn, 1999; Blundell et al., 2002; Pelkowski and Berger, 2004; Kalwij and Vermeulen,
2008). However, health has also an aect on economic outcomes of those individuals who
remain active on the labour market. Poor health might reduce productivity and thereby
wages and also aect the number of hours individuals work (e.g., Cai et al., 2008; Jaeckle
and Himmler, 2010).1
The income eect of a lower wage rate of individuals in bad health could be compen-
sated by longer working hours but poor health might also increase the disutility of labour.
Therefore, the direction of this eect is a priori indeterminate. Moreover, theoretical ar-
guments and empirical evidence suggest that individuals may not be able to freely adjust
their working hours to the desired level which again contributes to the welfare cost of poor
health.2 Many studies report a signicant degree of dissatisfaction with the current intensity
of work. Studies using US and Canadian data show that usually about 30% of men would
prefer to work longer hours, while about 10% would prefer shorter hours relative to what
they currently work (e.g., Altonji and Paxson, 1988; Dickens and Lundberg, 1993; Kahn
and Lang, 1991), suggesting an important degree of constraints on the labour market with
regard to the free choice of hours of work. In Europe, on the other hand, working men often
state preference for a reduction in hours of work. For example, Boeheim and Taylor (2004a)
and Stewart and Swaeld (1997) show for the UK that about 30% of all men would like to
reduce their working hours while 10% would like to work more. Euwals et al. (1998) report
similar ndings for the Netherlands.
Overall, many studies suggest that even in countries with liberal labour market insti-
tutions disequilibria between preferred and desired hours prevail, and that adjustment to
desired hours of work may be costly. For example Altonji and Paxson (1986, 1988) and
Martinez-Granado (2005) show for the US that changes in working hours occur more often
1For a review of earlier studies, see Currie and Madrian (1999).
2Kahn and Lang (1995, 1992) summarise theoretical models that imply hours constraints and test them
empirically with US data.
2between than within jobs. Blundell et al. (2008) nd the same pattern for the UK. From
the policy point of view it seems important to examine whether the disequilibria dier by
health status, an issue which has so far remained unexamined. This is in particular relevant
given the growing concerns about the relationship between health policies and labour market
participation and measures related to extending working lives.
In this paper we focus on the relationship between health and hours of work in Germany in
the years 1996-2007 using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). While
there are many studies showing that health is an essential determinant of employment, the
focus here is on its eect on the desired and actual intensity of work. The relatively inexible
nature of the German labour market, and the persisting dierences in labour arrangements
between east and west make the issue of hours adjustment particularly interesting (e.g. Wolf,
2000).
The empirical analysis of the eect of health on labour market outcomes entails several
important identication issues, which are related to the complex nature of their relationship
including employment, wages and hours of work. Health may aect the probability of em-
ployment, work intensity and productivity. At the same time, however, it may be aected
by the intensity of work and the level of income. Moreover, in the model of Grossman (1972)
poorer health on the one hand results in reduced total labour input, but the relationship may
be additionally stronger by the endogeneity of health if individuals treat it as investment in
human capital (Lee, 1982; Jaeckle and Himmler, 2010). There is also growing literature on
the consequences of non-employment on health (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1994; Bockerman
and Ilmakunnas, 2009; Haan and Myck, 2009).
With the data at hand it is in our view impossible, however, to estimate a model that
would at the same time account for the endogeneity of employment status, hours of work and
wages with respect to health and combine this with the analysis of hours disequilibrium anal-
ysis. We therefore analyse the relationship between hours and health from a dierent angle,
and focus on the identication of determinants of individual labour market disequilibrium
on the intensive margin. Importantly, given the nature of health and the hours disequilib-
rium, we are able to account for the dynamics in the processes which are found to play a
signicant role. Our study focuses on an unbalanced panel of German male employees aged
20-59, and the SOEP data provide a rich set of variables allowing detailed analyses of the
aspects we examine. The longitudinal aspect of the SOEP and the consistency of questions
being asked in the survey allows us to use both static and dynamic panel methods, with the
latter allowing to uncover important time eects of hours adjustment and eects of lagged
3health status. The SOEP contains also dierent types of health measures, two of which - a
self-assessed general health measure (SAH) and the legal disability status and degree (LDS)
- are used in the analysis.
The results conrm very limited part time work practices among men in Germany and the
data show substantial dierences between actual and desired hours of work, with the mean
dierence of about -3.9 hours per week. This dierence is about 1 hours per week higher in
the east than in the west. Interestingly men in the west work slightly shorter hours (about
2 hours less per week). We nd consistent evidence that health is an important determinant
of the hours disequilibrium in the west but no such evidence for east German data. In both
regions, however we conrm the role of the persistence of the disequilibrium and thus a
conrmation of the importance of a dynamic approach to modelling the dierence between
actual and desired hours. Once the dynamics are accounted for, self-assessed poor health
explains about 25% of the mean dierence between actual and desired hours. Interestingly
we nd no signicant eects of the legal disability status on the disequilibrium, which may
be interpreted as a result of a set of legal labour market advantages granted to disabled
individuals.
We start the paper by discussing the approach we take to modelling of the observed
disequilibrium between desired and actual hours of work in Section 1. This is followed by
data description in Section 2 and presentation of results in Section 3. Conclusions complete
the paper.
1 \Individual disequilibrium" in hours of work
The focus of our analysis is the impact of health on the observed discrepancy between realised
and desired hours of work to which we refer to as the \individual hours disequilibrium".3
Studies of determinants of labour market intensity usually assume a high degree of exibility
in the choice of hours of work, although it has been recognised for a long time that simple
hours choice models cannot generate the observed highly concentrated hours distribution
(Kahn and Lang, 1991; Dickens and Lundberg, 1993). So far the literature has ignored the
role played by health in determining such disequilibria and we aim to ll this gap. The
disequilibrium may have particular relevance for Germany given the relatively inexible
character of its labour market. In the simplest framework of full exibility on the labour
3This dierence, what we call \individual hours disequilibrium", is sometimes referred to as \hour tension"
(see e.g., Merz, 2002). Or, as Boeheim and Taylor (2004b) put it, employees can be considered \over-" or
\underemployed".
4market one would expect that if health has an eect on wages and/or desired hours of work,
individuals would freely choose their preferred intensity conditional on their wage, and so
health would not present any additional constraint. However, if the intensity of work cannot
be adjusted freely to suit one's preferences, an important question to ask is of the role of
health in determining this disequilibrium.
The dependent variable we analyse is the dierence between desired and actual hours of
work, where the desired hours are answers to the following question in the SOEP survey:
 If you could choose your own number of working hours, taking into account that your
income would change according to the number of hours: How many hours would you
want to work?
Since the question specically takes into account the change in income resulting from dierent
work intensity, one can assume that it implies the preferred individual point on the budget
constraint, unrestricted by demand conditions. Thus if labour market demand were perfectly
exible, we would expect there to be no systematic dierences in this measure of individual
disequilibrium. This is largely the case in the data, but as we shall see there are several
factors, including health, which signicantly aect this disequilibrium. Figure 1 shows kernel
densities of key variables used in the analysis: actual hours of work, desired hours of work and
the dierence between them, i.e. the distribution of the \individual disequilibrium" variable.
The densities are based on pooled SOEP data for men aged 20-59 for years 1996-2007 and
are given separately for individuals living in east and west German L ander.
Figure 1: Kernel densities of weekly hours by region
1A - Actual hours of work 1B - Desired hours of work 1C - Individual disequilibrium
Source: Authors' calculations based on SOEP 1996-2007 data.
Figure 1A shows the distribution of actual hours of work. This distribution has the
characteristic kink at around 40 working hours. Part-time work is very uncommon among
men in Germany and the distribution piles up at points above 40. Mean working hours are
slightly higher in east Germany. Figure 1B shows the corresponding distribution of desiredhours. This distribution has much less mass above 40 hours and interestingly there is also
a spike at 30 hours which has no corresponding shape in the actual distribution. Looking
at the dierence of these two distributions, we see that in gure 1C the mean dierence is
negative. On average men would want to reduce working time by about four hours. Nearly
30% do not want to change their working time and about 60% want to reduce it. Conditional
on the desire to reduce working time, the average is 7.9 hours per week. The unconditional
dierence is slightly higher in east Germany and for men in poor health.
1.1 Modelling determinants of the individual hours disequilibrium
The individual hours disequilibrium is thus dened as: it = h
it hit, where h
it are the desired
hours, and hit are the actual hours of work. Formally we could present this dierence, as
a dierence between unconstrained hours of work, resulting from individual optimisation









The individual disequilibrium would thus depend on a set of taste-shifting variables on the
one hand, and on demand factors such as time of the interview, occupation and tenure on the
other. Interestingly health might aect both demand for and supply of labour, conditional
on the wage level. Less healthy individuals may wish to work shorter hours due to health
constraints, or longer hours due to income eects of reduced earnings capacity. At the same
time, if employers for some reason cannot freely adjust wages, they may require unhealthy
individuals to work longer hours. Dierent nature of poor health may also have dierent
eects on the disequilibrium. The legal advantages of the ocial disability status may imply
that those with disability may be less constrained by required overtime, but at the same
time might nd it more dicult to justify working overtime to their employers.
Our basic specication of the estimated equation is:
it = Hit + Xit + i + "it (3)
where Hit are variables controlling for health, Xit are other observable characteristics
including individual characteristics and demand-related variables, i is an individual xed
6eect, and "it is time-varying residual. Since it is a combination of preferences and demand
constraints, it is likely that there is a dynamic component in the process. One could thus







rHit r + Xit + i + "it (4)
The characteristics of the process are largely an empirical question, but they seem im-
portant from the point of view of the estimation of the eects of shocks to the equilibrium,
resulting for example from changes in health status. As we shall see the estimated conse-
quences of shocks to health on the individual disequilibrium signicantly depend on whether
this dynamic element is taken into account. This is particularly important given the high
degree of persistence in the health process in the German data (Haan and Myck, 2009).
The role of the determinants of the individual disequilibrium are estimated using three
main specications. We take advantage of the panel dimension of the data to estimate, on
the one hand, the relationship in its static representation (equation 3) using the random and
xed eects models, and on the other, the dynamic formulation presented in equation (4). In
the latter case we use the system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995).
2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) for
the years 1996-2007, with the rst and last years of the series used only for generating lags
and selection controls for the principal 1997-2006 sample. The SOEP data contains detailed
information on a large number of German households, including details of the number of
hours worked (contractual, actual, and desired) and several health indicators.4 Our analysis
focuses on a sample of prime age men (20-59) in east and west Germany. Women, civil
servants and self-employed individuals are excluded from the sample.
2.1 Health status
We choose two dierent health measures from SOEP that are available for the whole obser-
vation period. First of all, we use a 5-scale measure of self-assessed health (SAH).5 Secondly,
we control for the legal disability status and the degree of disability. While the latter is more
4See, e.g., Wagner et al. (2007) for more information on SOEP.
5The specic question is \How would you describe your current health?" and respondents can choose
between \very good", \good", \satisfactory", \not so good", and \bad".
7directly linked to health-related capability of labour market involvement,6 the rst measure
is much broader and covers both physical and mental health. Several studies have pointed
out that the self assessed status may contain measurement errors, the extent of which may
be related to individuals' labour market status, and that it may only imperfectly reect the
\true" state of health (e.g., Bound, 1991; Bound et al., 1999). However, the SAH measures
strongly correlate with \objective" health (e.g., Wannamethe and Shaper, 1991; Idler and
Benyamini, 1997; Larsson et al., 2002), and it has been shown that at least within nation and
gender groups the SAH should provide consistent reections of health status (Lindeboom
and van Doorslaer, 2004). In the particular application in this paper we limit the analysis to
prime-age working men, which is a relatively homogenous group, and thus reporting hetero-
geneity ought not to be a major problem. In the analysis the variable is dichotomised into
\good" which includes the top two SAH categories and \poor" dened by the bottom three.
The disability indicator comprises two dierent types of disability that are not dier-
entiated in the survey, namely legal severe disability status and reduced earnings capacity
(REC) which may qualify for full or partial disability pensions. The degree of legal severe
disability is measured in percent in the range between 20 and 100. In general, \severe dis-
ability" status applies to individuals with a disability degree of 50% or more. It implies
several protective rights with respect to the labour market without imposing any maximum
working hours.7 Moreover, employers with more than 19 employees are obliged to employ at
least 5% severely disabled or face a certain monthly contribution. This requirement might
imply greater bargaining power of the severely disabled employees vis-a-vis employers with
respect to the choice of hours, which is conrmed in our analysis.
In contrast, the regulations on REC cover individuals not capable of working in a \nor-
mal" employment relationship which prior to 2001 was expressed in terms of earnings as
inability to earn a wage of more than 1/7 of the average monthly wage over a longer period
of time. Since 2001 it refers to the number of hours worked, with inability to work more
than 3 hours per day making individuals eligible for full REC (6 hours for partial REC).
Reduced earnings capacity also implies eligibility for disability pensions. While in the data
we cannot distinguish legal and REC disability status, given the incentives the REC pro-
vides we are unlikely to observe many individuals with REC active on the labour market.
6The survey question reads \Are you legally classied as handicapped or capable of gainful employment
only to a reduced extent due to medical reasons?." and \What is the extent of this capability reduction or
handicap according to the most recent diagnosis?" (in %).
7Individuals with severe disability status acquire special dismissal protection, longer annual leave,
favourable tax treatment and an early retirement option.
8Generally therefore, we expect the majority of employed respondents who answer to have a
health related handicap to have the legal severe disability status.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of health status in west and east Germany. SAH is
reported as dichotomised into a \poor health" variable, where poor health is classied as
reported \bad", \not so good" and \satisfactory". This type of dichotomisation leads to high
proportions of individuals classied as being in \poor health" both out and in work, and is
dictated by the fact that our analysis focuses on the employed sample in which the proportion
of those in \bad" and \not so good" health among prime-age men is very low. According to
the chosen dichotomisation about 40% of employees in the west declare \poor health" and
this proportion is a few percentage points higher in the east. Disability on the other hand
is declared by a lower proportion of western employees compared to the working population
in the east. Regional dierences are higher for non-employed men, though the small sample
size in this case leads to high variation in the computed statistics for both east and west
over time. As many as 56% of non-employed men in the east declare \poor health" in 2002,
and this proportion is even higher at 63% for non-employed males in the west. Interestingly
both \poor health" and disability show a growing trend among the non-employed, but are
relatively stable among the sample of employees.
2.2 Potential sources of sample selection bias
As in all studies related to labour market participation our results must be carefully analysed
with regard to several potential sources of sample selection bias. The analysis is focused on
men aged 20-59 and excludes individuals who at any time in the survey are civil servants
or self-employed (and in the relevant age range). We also exclude students, though only
at the time of their study, i.e. once individuals leave education they are included in the
sample. Naturally, the data on actual and desired hours of work comes only from employed
individuals. About 4.9% of all men in the chosen age group are never observed as working
during the time of their participation in the survey. A larger proportion of some 40%,
however, are non-employed at some point in time covered by the data. In these cases we
distinguish between absorbing and non-absorbing selection, and we allocate individuals to the
rst category if during the time in which they participate in the survey they are observed
as non-employed in at least two last years covered by the data. All other forms of non-
employment are treated as non-absorbing selection. The distinction in our view is justied
by the focus of the paper, since health may be an important reason for permanently leaving
the labour market and we want to distinguish permanent departures from non-permanent
9ones. As Haan and Myck (2009) have shown, deteriorating health among German men
signicantly aects the probability of being employed, and given the high degree of state
dependence in health, non-employment resulting from deteriorating health may be long-term
or permanent. In all specications we therefore test for both absorbing and non-absorbing
selection bias following the method proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992). While this has
been developed in the context of the random eects model, it is also applicable to xed eects
models (Wooldridge, 2004), and we include absorbing and non-absorbing selection controls
also in the dynamic panel models. In the relationships we estimate including selection
controls in the models has negligible eect on the estimated coecients in all specications
in particular if xed eects are accounted for.
Due to the nature of the dynamic GMM estimation the sample used for our main analysis
is restricted further, and includes only the individuals who have a series of at least four
uninterrupted observations of the actual and desired hours of work. In addition we need to
drop the initial observations for which there are no lagged instruments. This reduces the
sample and limits it to individuals with strong labour market attachment. Table 2 shows
the degree of this reduction. The number of observations in the RE/FE sample is 21196 and
6571 in the west and east respectively, while for the GMM sample it is 11930 and 3530. Even
if we exclude years 1997 and 1998 from the static estimation samples the GMM samples are
about 65% of the size of FE/RE samples. As we show in Section 3 this further selection
does not remain without consequences on the static estimation in particular in the east. The
results using west German data are however generally stable across the samples. Since the
dynamic estimations show important features of both the German labour market and the
relationship between health and the individual disequilibrium in hours, we take these as our
principal specication.
Basic descriptive statistics on the static (FE/RE) the dynamic (GMM) samples and are
given in Table 3. German men work about 43 hours per week and on average express the
desire to work approximately 4 hours less. Work time is higher in the east than in the west
and employees in the east on average want to reduce their work intensity by about an hour
more then those in the west. Among employees health seems to be slightly better in the
west than in the east, but at the same time east German employees are less likely to have
the legal disability status. This discrepancy may relate to disability-related employment
selection. The table shows that as far as observable characteristics are concerned there is
little evidence of important dierences between the employee samples for static and dynamic
estimations. Selection control variables, however show that the GMM sample is much more
10stable with much lower proportions of individuals with non-absorbing and absorbing selection
indicators. As one could expect both types of selection indicators are also higher for the east
than for the west samples.
3 Results
Results of the GMM estimations are presented in Tables 4 and 5 for west and east L ander,
while Tables 6, 7 and 8 show results of static random (RE) and xed (FE) eects estimations
run using dierent selection criteria to demonstrate the eect of restricting the sample to
facilitate the dynamic GMM and to show the eects of controlling for selection in the static
specications. Results of both static and dynamic estimations signicantly dier by region
and we discuss them separately.
For the GMM specications we present estimates of four equations two using the dier-
ence GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and two using the system GMM estimator
(Arellano and Bover, 1995). In the case of each of these we estimate the models with and
without selection controls for absorbing and non-absorbing selection. In the GMM results
selection controls are not statistically signicant and including them in the estimations has
negligible eect on the values of the estimated coecients. Since in the case of the dynamic
panel only those observed as not working after a relatively long spell of employment are seen
as \selecting out" of work, this could be a result of the specicity of the sample. For this
reason we show static FE and RE estimations run on the full sample in each case again with
and without selection controls (Table 6). In this case, while several selection controls appear
signicant, the eect of including them on the coecients of interest, i.e. those on health is
noticeable only in the case of RE specications. Once xed eects are controlled for selection
out of the sample appears to have little eect on the estimations of the relationship between
health and the hours disequilibrium.
The GMM system estimates for both east and west suggest statistically signicant per-
sistence in the dierence between desired and actual hours. The estimated coecients are
small (approximately 0.1 in the east and 0.2 in the west) but they suggest that not only
is there likely to be persistence in the discrepancy between desired and actual hours, but
also that there may be positive feedback from past disequilibria, contributing to growing
dissatisfaction with current hours. According to the estimates on west German employees a
ve-hour disequilibrium in year t-2 would translate to almost six and a half hours at time t.
The results show interesting eects of health on the disequilibrium, with the coecients
11on SAH \poor health" being stable and signicant across specications using the west Ger-
man data. The system GMM estimation suggests a negative eect of poor health of about
0.4 hours on the hours disequilibrium, with less healthy individuals desiring to reduce their
work intensity. Importantly, we also nd signicant eects of lagged poor health status.
These eects combined would suggest that a permanent health shock at time t-1 would lead
an individual on average to desire from three-quarters to one hour less than his actual hours
of work. This is about a quarter of the mean dierence between desired and actual hours in
the data. Interestingly, no such eects are found in the east, where while the hours disequi-
librium also seems to have a dynamic element, the eects of SAH poor health are actually
positive, though they are not signicant in the GMM dierence estimation.
Ocial disability status does not have any signicant eect on the hours disequilibrium
either in the east or west of Germany, which may initially seem surprising. As we noted
earlier, however, ocial disability grants employees certain specic legal advantages which
may give them a greater bargaining power vis-a-vis their employers, and thus facilitate easier
adjustment to desired hours of work. Another possible explanation may be that working
disabled individuals have easier access to \outside options" and those observed as working
may be a more selected sample of those disabled who are satised with their work conditions
including its intensity.
Tables 7 and 8 show some further robustness checks concerning the role of sample selection
in our analysis. This time, the selection relates to moving from the samples for panel
estimation (as reported in Table 6) to the GMM sample. Tables 7 and 8 report four sets of
random and xed eect estimations using three dierent samples:
 RE/FE-1: static samples without lagged health status (the same as in Table 6)
 RE/FE-2 static samples with lagged health status
 GMM sample used for estimations with and without lagged health status
Once again the estimations are run separately for west (Table 7) and east (Table 8) Ger-
many, and they all include selection controls. The results, in particular for the east, suggest
important consequences for the estimation of moving from the full RE/FE sample to the
restricted GMM sample. Estimation using west German data is far more stable and shows
less variation due to sample composition. For example, although east German data in all
specications conrms a positive eect of \poor health" on the hours disequilibrium, the re-
sults are only statistically signicant both in the RE and FE specications when based on the
12restricted GMM sample. Other specications give non-signicant coecients of much lower
magnitude. On the other hand, all random and xed eects estimations run on the west
German sample produce results similar in magnitude to those estimated using the GMM,
and the eect of the GMM sample restriction is much lower.
4 Conclusion
How health relates to labour market activity is a key issue for employment policies and an
important aspect in understanding individual economic behaviour. While it is relatively well
established that health plays an important role in determining employment, its eect on
productivity as well as on choices and opportunities on the `intensive margin' of employment
are not yet very well researched. We believe that if labour market policy aimed at increasing
employment is to be eective, in particular concerning participation of older individuals,
then more attention ought to be given to the constraints imposed by poor health on both
those still employed and those seeking employment. This paper focuses on the former group
and the quantitative results may have important policy implications.
Using data on prime-age men from the German Socio-Economic Panel for years 1996-
2007 we examined the eect of health on the hours of work disequilibrium, dened as the
dierence between desired and actual hours of work. The analysis has been set in a dynamic
framework to capture state dependence of the disequilibrium and lagged eects of health on
welfare at work. Focusing on the sample of employees and limiting it further to allow for
the dynamic estimation entailed important sample restrictions, but using various selection
controls, following Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and Wooldridge (2004), we showed that se-
lection into employment has negligible eect on the estimation of key coecients. Moreover,
for the west German sample the further sample restrictions to allow the application of the
dynamic GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) produces very similar results to those
obtained on the non-restricted sample.
Most important results of the study include our identication of state-dependence in the
hours disequilibrium suggesting positive eects of lagged values on current dierence between
desired and actual hours of work. The magnitude of this eect is about 0.2 and 0.1 for the
rst and second lags accordingly in the west and is lower but also statistically signicant in
the east.
Concerning the key parameter of our interest, namely health, we found that self-assessed
current and lagged \poor health" has signicant eects on the hours disequilibrium in the
13west, with unhealthy individuals expressing the desire to work shorter hours relative to their
actual hours of work. Current \poor health" implies an increase of the disequilibrium by
about 0.4 hours, while lagged \poor health" about 0.3 hours. Depending on the estimation
including state dependence the eect of long-term \poor health" is on average between 0.8-1.0
hour. This is about a quarter of the mean hours disequilibrium observed in the data. Results
for the east German sample proved less stable and more sensitive to sample restrictions. The
dynamic GMM estimation in this case found a surprising positive eect of \poor health" on
the dierence between desired and actual hours of work. While this could be a reection
of a possible income eect of poor health on intensity of work, the more likely explanation
seems to be related to the sample restrictions imposed by the method we used. Unlike for
the sample using data from western German L ander, the static results based on unrestricted
east German data showed no signicant eects of health on the hours disequilibrium.
One surprising result of the analysis relates to the lack of any eect of disability status
on the hours disequilibrium. This could be interpreted as the eect of a stronger position
of legally disabled individuals on the labour market, in which case the one could argue that
the stronger bargaining position allows disabled individuals to chose their hours of work
more freely. On the other hand this might be a reection of a particular sample selection,
with the working disabled individuals being more likely to leave employment in case of their
dissatisfaction with their working conditions. One way or the other the lack of the eect of
disability status on the hours disequilibrium and the contrast to the eect of general \poor
health" points towards potentially interesting questions concerning the role of legislation for
hours adjustment on the labour market.
It seems intuitive that the possibility of exible hours adjustment, in particular among
older and less healthy individuals would play a role in their decisions to remain active on
the labour market. Health has been shown to be a signicant factor in determining employ-
ment, and we have demonstrated that its deterioration may contribute to the increase in
the dissatisfaction with the intensity of work. This suggests that there is potential to im-
prove work quality by making working time more exible to those whose health deteriorates,
and who do not qualify for disability. Improved opportunities for hours adjustment might
be an important element contributing to the extension of active involvement on the labour
market and greater exibility might encourage those who already left it to return to active
participation.
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Table 1: Health and disability status by year and employment status
Year Non-employed Employed
West East West East
PHa Disab.b PHa Disab.b PHa Disab.b PHa Disab.b
1997 39.9 13.0 43.0 7.6 39.9 7.8 43.8 5.9
1998 43.5 13.9 49.3 10.0 40.9 9.4 44.1 5.1
1999 42.6 16.8 57.2 11.1 39.8 8.7 43.9 5.1
2000 51.2 19.7 51.3 14.6 40.3 8.3 44.2 4.3
2001 48.9 23.4 55.6 12.9 38.5 6.7 39.4 4.5
2002 46.1 18.8 55.8 15.3 40.5 7.7 42.1 4.1
2003 52.0 18.6 48.8 12.1 39.9 9.0 43.9 3.5
2004 56.2 20.3 49.1 10.3 39.7 9.5 41.5 4.9
2005 55.7 23.2 53.9 16.4 45.0 10.1 43.5 4.4
2006 62.9 24.2 48.5 18.3 43.3 9.1 38.9 4.5
a PH: poor health;
b Disab.: disability
Source: Authors' calculations based on SOEP 1997 - 2006
Table 2: Observations by year and samples
Year FE & RE Sample GMM Sample
All West East All West East
1997 2148 1546 602 0 0 0
1998 2071 1503 568 0 0 0
1999 2331 1721 610 1495 1105 390
2000 2270 1664 606 1491 1099 392
2001 3418 2628 790 1638 1227 411
2002 3203 2466 737 1589 1192 397
2003 3027 2342 685 2348 1824 524
2004 2876 2203 673 2224 1733 491
2005 2646 2047 599 2089 1647 442
2006 2463 1892 571 2004 1565 439
Total 27767 21196 6571 15460 11930 3530
Source: Authors' calculations based on SOEP 1996 - 2007
19Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Regression samples
FE/RE Sample GMM Sample
All West East All West East
Des. - act. hours -4.01 -3.74 -4.87 -3.86 -3.63 -4.65
Actual hours 42.9 42.4 44.5 42.7 42.3 44.3
Health:
SAH - Very good 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.06
SAH - Good 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.51
SAH - Satisfactory 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.35
SAH - Not so good 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07
SAH - Bad 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
\Poor health" 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.43
Disability 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05
East German 0.24 0 1 0.23 0 1
Age 40.1 39.9 40.8 41.3 41.0 42.2
Low edu. 0.30 0.36 0.12 0.29 0.35 0.09
Middle edu. 0.41 0.36 0.60 0.42 0.37 0.61
Higher edu. 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.30
Married 0.70 0.71 0.68 0.74 0.75 0.73
Kids 0-4 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.13
Kids 5-10 0.29 0.33 0.17 0.31 0.35 0.17
Kids 11-18 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.40
Foreigner 0.16 0.21 0.01 0.16 0.21 0.01
Selection 1 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.06
Selection 2 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.14
N 27767 21196 6571 15460 11930 3530
Selection 1 refers to missing hours (non-absorbing selection),
Selection 2 refers to absorbing selection.
Source: Authors' calculations based on SOEP 1996 - 2007
20Table 4: Dierence of desired and actual hours, sample: West
Without selection With selection
Di.GMM Sys.GMM Di.GMM Sys.GMM
L.Des. - act. hours 0:207 0:179 0:207 0:180
(0:026) (0:023) (0:026) (0:022)
L2.Des. - act. hours 0:088 0:083 0:088 0:084
(0:017) (0:017) (0:017) (0:017)
Poor health  0:499  0:370  0:498  0:368
(0:185) (0:126) (0:185) (0:126)
L.Poor health  0:399  0:317  0:398  0:316
(0:176) (0:125) (0:176) (0:125)
Disability  0:544  0:056  0:511  0:045
(0:550) (0:346) (0:550) (0:347)
L.Disability  0:282 0:632y  0:251 0:626y
(0:529) (0:344) (0:531) (0:345)
Age2=10  0:048  0:164  0:049  0:163
(0:031) (0:102) (0:030) (0:103)
Age3=100 0:008y 0:015y 0:009y 0:015y
(0:005) (0:008) (0:005) (0:008)
Married  1:046  0:236  1:048  0:235
(0:505) (0:193) (0:506) (0:192)
Number of children between:
0 and 4 years 0:474y 0:299 0:478y 0:297
(0:271) (0:142) (0:271) (0:142)
5 and 10 years  0:108  0:133  0:098  0:134
(0:257) (0:109) (0:257) (0:109)
11 and 18 years 0:052 0:175y 0:058 0:174y
(0:215) (0:099) (0:215) (0:099)
Years of educationa:
11-12 years  0:686  0:683
(0:173) (0:173)




Selection 1  0:537  0:386
(0:547) (0:377)
Selection 2  0:543 0:032
(0:734) (0:485)
Constant 0:567  6:900 0:339  6:844
(1:902) (5:384) (1:907) (5:392)
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es
Interview month Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 11930 11930 11930 11930
Number of groups 2968 2968 2968 2968
Hansen(p) 0:96 0:85 0:97 0:84
AR1 Test 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
AR2 Test 0:44 0:30 0:44 0:29
Instruments 59 92 61 94
a Reference category: 7-10 years.
y(p < 0:10); (p < 0:05);   (p < 0:01)
Source: Authors' calculations based on SOEP 1996-2007
21Table 5: Dierence of desired and actual hours, sample: East
Without selection With selection
Di.GMM Sys.GMM Di.GMM Sys.GMM
L.Des. - act. hours  0:026 0:123  0:030 0:122
(0:040) (0:040) (0:041) (0:039)
L2.Des. - act. hours 0:002 0:073 0:001 0:074
(0:026) (0:028) (0:026) (0:028)
Poor health 0:422 0:606 0:421 0:608
(0:284) (0:247) (0:284) (0:247)
L.Poor health  0:367  0:305  0:372  0:307
(0:318) (0:267) (0:317) (0:267)
Disability  1:900  1:045  1:888  1:046
(2:517) (1:902) (2:410) (1:928)
L.Disability 0:006 1:712 0:022 1:739
(1:277) (1:715) (1:271) (1:738)
Age2=10 0:040 0:173 0:020 0:144
(0:054) (0:252) (0:054) (0:255)
Age3=100  0:004  0:014  0:002  0:012
(0:008) (0:020) (0:008) (0:020)
Married  0:321  0:360  0:300  0:372
(0:757) (0:412) (0:756) (0:413)
Number of children between:
0 and 4 years  0:216  0:098  0:193  0:074
(0:439) (0:325) (0:440) (0:326)
5 and 10 years 0:613 0:284 0:638 0:283
(0:481) (0:311) (0:482) (0:311)
11 and 18 years 0:883 0:266 0:868 0:266
(0:357) (0:206) (0:357) (0:205)
Years of educationa:
11-12 years  1:552  1:568
(0:630) (0:634)




Selection 1 0:887 0:294
(0:855) (0:648)
Selection 2  0:895  1:182
(1:090) (0:965)
Constant  8:873 7:970  7:477 6:701
(3:636) (13:621) (3:606) (13:732)
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es
Interview month Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 3530 3530 3530 3530
Number of groups 880 880 880 880
Hansen(p) 0:16 0:24 0:16 0:26
AR1 Test 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
AR2 Test 0:78 0:60 0:76 0:59
Instruments 59 92 61 94
a Reference category: 7-10 years.
y(p < 0:10); (p < 0:05);   (p < 0:01)
Source: Authors' calculations based on SOEP 1996-2007
22Table 6: Dierence of desired and actual hours, sample: west and east
West East
Without selection With selection Without selection With selection
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE
Poor health  0:415    0:418    0:414    0:418   0:089 0:148 0:063 0:138
(0:106) (0:117) (0:106) (0:117) (0:215) (0:241) (0:215) (0:241)
Disability  0:059  0:264  0:075  0:263 0:259  0:073 0:123  0:151
(0:258) (0:330) (0:258) (0:330) (0:662) (0:994) (0:661) (0:994)
Years of education
11-12 years  0:943    0:937    0:520  0:364
(0:220) (0:220) (0:533) (0:531)
12.5+ years  2:245    2:238    2:038    1:808  
(0:232) (0:232) (0:577) (0:576)
Age  0:433  0:723y  0:474  0:736y  0:936  0:770  0:980y  0:796
(0:297) (0:396) (0:298) (0:398) (0:580) (0:785) (0:581) (0:787)
Age2=10 0:054 0:153 0:065 0:156 0:199 0:214 0:214 0:223
(0:076) (0:100) (0:077) (0:101) (0:149) (0:198) (0:149) (0:199)
Age3=100  0:001  0:009  0:002  0:010  0:013  0:015  0:015  0:016
(0:006) (0:008) (0:006) (0:008) (0:012) (0:016) (0:012) (0:016)
Married  0:498    0:516  0:495    0:525  1:401    1:142  1:327    1:152
(0:177) (0:237) (0:177) (0:237) (0:370) (0:551) (0:369) (0:551)
Number of children
0 and 4 years 0:163 0:276y 0:162 0:279  0:223  0:382  0:234  0:372
(0:120) (0:142) (0:120) (0:142) (0:297) (0:357) (0:297) (0:357)
5 and 10 years 0:042 0:107 0:041 0:109 0:351 0:301 0:341 0:310
(0:101) (0:130) (0:101) (0:130) (0:268) (0:331) (0:267) (0:331)
11 and 18 years 0:255   0:179 0:254   0:181 0:209 0:144 0:199 0:135
(0:091) (0:118) (0:091) (0:118) (0:192) (0:240) (0:192) (0:240)
Selection 1  0:248  0:493 1:110   0:875
(0:213) (0:237) (0:345) (0:393)
Selection 2 0:566  0:005 1:662   0:687
(0:357) (0:422) (0:572) (0:692)
Constant 6:428y 6:842 6:920y 7:040 9:682 1:202 9:712 1:394
(3:691) (5:029) (3:699) (5:048) (7:194) (9:955) (7:194) (9:985)
Year dummies Y es No Y es No Y es No Y es No
Interview month Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 21196 21196 21196 21196 6571 6571 6571 6571
Number of groups 4499 4499 4499 4499 1458 1458 1458 1458
Random vs. pooled: 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
FE vs. RE: Hausman 0:00 0:00 0:19 0:08
a Reference category: 7-10 years.
y(p < 0:10); (p < 0:05);   (p < 0:01)
Source: Authors' calculations based on SOEP 1996-2007
23Table 7: RE and FE estimates on static and GMM samples: west
Random eects Fixed eects
Sample: RE/FE-1 GMM RE/FE-2 GMM RE/FE-1 GMM RE/FE-2 GMM
Poor health  0:414  0:400  0:320  0:375  0:418  0:299  0:235y  0:317
(0:106) (0:124) (0:115) (0:125) (0:117) (0:140) (0:128) (0:140)
L.Poor health  0:198y  0:297  0:196  0:243y
(0:116) (0:126) (0:129) (0:142)
Disability  0:075 0:137  0:431  0:148  0:263 0:013  0:295  0:018
(0:258) (0:301) (0:319) (0:351) (0:330) (0:416) (0:371) (0:421)
L.Disability 0:955 0:689y 0:816 0:293
(0:330) (0:358) (0:381) (0:424)
Years of educationa:
11-12 years  0:937  0:940  0:858  0:930
(0:220) (0:241) (0:226) (0:241)
12.5+ years  2:238  2:720  2:665  2:729
(0:232) (0:258) (0:241) (0:258)
Age  0:474 0:221  0:410 0:229  0:736y  0:397  0:954y  0:375
(0:298) (0:467) (0:376) (0:467) (0:398) (0:685) (0:526) (0:686)
Age2=10 0:065  0:101 0:052  0:102 0:156 0:081 0:228y 0:076
(0:077) (0:116) (0:095) (0:116) (0:101) (0:168) (0:131) (0:168)
Age3=100  0:002 0:011  0:001 0:011  0:010  0:004  0:016  0:003
(0:006) (0:009) (0:008) (0:009) (0:008) (0:013) (0:011) (0:013)
Married  0:495  0:499  0:381  0:493  0:525  0:933  0:653  0:936
(0:177) (0:214) (0:192) (0:214) (0:237) (0:318) (0:273) (0:318)
Number of children between:
0 and 4 years 0:162 0:306 0:149 0:305 0:279 0:422 0:306y 0:426
(0:120) (0:150) (0:133) (0:149) (0:142) (0:188) (0:163) (0:188)
5 and 10 years 0:041  0:033 0:031  0:032 0:109 0:121 0:134 0:128
(0:101) (0:123) (0:110) (0:122) (0:130) (0:175) (0:151) (0:175)
11 and 18 years 0:254 0:195y 0:192y 0:201y 0:181 0:154 0:114 0:161
(0:091) (0:110) (0:099) (0:110) (0:118) (0:159) (0:136) (0:159)
Selection 1  0:248  0:602y  0:523  0:590y  0:493  0:899  0:344  0:898
(0:213) (0:308) (0:262) (0:308) (0:237) (0:361) (0:297) (0:361)
Selection 2 0:566 0:241 0:133 0:237  0:005  0:010 0:251  0:013
(0:357) (0:495) (0:427) (0:494) (0:422) (0:582) (0:512) (0:582)
Constant 6:920y  2:250 5:641  2:378 7:040 2:201 8:426 1:904
(3:699) (6:059) (4:788) (6:055) (5:048) (9:026) (6:815) (9:028)
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es No No No No
Interview month Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 21196 11930 15800 11930 21196 11930 15800 11930
Number of groups 4499 2968 3595 2968 4499 2968 3595 2968
Random vs. pooled: LM Test 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
FE vs. RE: Hausman Test 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
FE and RE refer to the sample for static and dynamic panel models. GMM refers to the sample necessary for the dynamic GMM estimators.
a Reference category: 7-10 years.
y(p < 0:10); (p < 0:05);   (p < 0:01)
Source: Authors' calculations based on SOEP 1996-2007
24Table 8: RE and FE estimates on static and GMM samples: east
Random eects Fixed eects
Sample: RE/FE-1 GMM RE/FE-2 GMM RE/FE-1 GMM RE/FE-2 GMM
Poor health 0:063 0:467y 0:275 0:500 0:138 0:605 0:408 0:584
(0:215) (0:253) (0:238) (0:255) (0:241) (0:285) (0:264) (0:287)
L.Poor health  0:223  0:339  0:138  0:251
(0:238) (0:255) (0:263) (0:287)
Disability 0:123 0:645 0:643 0:304  0:151 0:326 0:360 0:226
(0:661) (0:846) (1:002) (1:127) (0:994) (1:428) (1:213) (1:449)
L.Disability 0:467 0:640 0:105 0:469
(1:024) (1:129) (1:221) (1:400)
Years of educationa:
11-12 years  0:364  1:073  0:387  1:093
(0:531) (0:730) (0:651) (0:730)
12.5+ years  1:808 2:934  1:706  2:973
(0:576) (0:769) (0:695) (0:769)
Age  0:980y  1:193  1:118  1:213  0:796  1:164  1:507  1:187
(0:581) (0:979) (0:770) (0:979) (0:787) (1:404) (1:055) (1:405)
Age2=10 0:214 0:277 0:236 0:283 0:223 0:294 0:372 0:301
(0:149) (0:240) (0:193) (0:240) (0:199) (0:341) (0:261) (0:341)
Age3=100  0:015  0:021  0:016  0:022  0:016  0:021  0:026  0:022
(0:012) (0:019) (0:016) (0:019) (0:016) (0:027) (0:021) (0:027)
Married  1:327 0:681  0:768y  0:670  1:152  0:789  0:785  0:788
(0:369) (0:451) (0:417) (0:451) (0:551) (0:704) (0:630) (0:705)
Number of children between:
0 and 4 years  0:234 0:115  0:341 0:116  0:372 0:260  0:304 0:266
(0:297) (0:361) (0:333) (0:361) (0:357) (0:445) (0:397) (0:445)
5 and 10 years 0:341 0:592y 0:438 0:589y 0:310 0:912 0:684y 0:922
(0:267) (0:338) (0:306) (0:338) (0:331) (0:435) (0:380) (0:435)
11 and 18 years 0:199 0:299 0:095 0:305 0:135 0:460 0:233 0:471
(0:192) (0:234) (0:216) (0:234) (0:240) (0:298) (0:269) (0:298)
Selection 1 1:110 0:908y 0:619 0:933y 0:875 1:222 0:847y 1:247
(0:345) (0:528) (0:446) (0:529) (0:393) (0:602) (0:510) (0:603)
Selection 2 1:662 0:298 0:378 0:310 0:687 0:211 1:166 0:218
(0:572) (0:816) (0:718) (0:816) (0:692) (0:966) (0:850) (0:966)
Constant 9:712 12:967 11:973 13:234 1:394 7:468 11:734 7:724
(7:194) (12:837) (9:831) (12:837) (9:985) (18:658) (13:704) (18:671)
Year dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es No No No No
Interview month Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 6571 3530 4727 3530 6571 3530 4727 3530
Number of groups 1458 880 1094 880 1458 880 1094 880
Random vs. pooled: LM Test 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
FE vs. RE: Hausman Test 0:08 0:50 0:00 0:60
FE and RE refer to the sample for static and dynamic panel models. GMM refers to the sample necessary for the dynamic GMM estimators.
a Reference category: 7-10 years.
y(p < 0:10); (p < 0:05);   (p < 0:01)
Source: Authors' calculations based on SOEP 1996-2007
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